If your IT support uses ScreenConnect, ask them one question this week
If someone looks after your computers remotely, there's a fair chance they use ConnectWise ScreenConnect to do it. This week attackers used a flaw in an add-on for it to install their own remote access on business PCs.
ScreenConnect itself isn't the problem, according to ConnectWise. The add-on is. But the result for you is the same: a stranger with a way into your machines. Here's what happened and the one question to ask your IT provider.
What happened
ScreenConnect is a remote support tool. Your IT company installs a small client on your PCs, and when you ring with a problem they can see your screen and fix it. Lots of IT providers use it, and it supports extensions that add extra features.
One of those is a third-party extension called RMM+. ConnectWise has published an advisory, CVE-2026-127063, for it, rated 9.3 out of 10 (Critical). The flaw is that the extension used a "static API secret by default". In plain English, a key that should have been unique wasn't, so an attacker who knew it could get in.
Huntress, a security firm, spotted the attacks on 11 November. It says the attackers used ScreenConnect's own command feature to push out a second, rogue ScreenConnect client plus a set of scripts it calls SCKit. Huntress counted at least 288 machines across 48 organisations in about 90 minutes, then a second wave on 13 November of 205 machines across 41 organisations.
The Register covered it on Thursday.
Does it affect you?
There are two ways in, and they need different action.
Your IT provider uses ScreenConnect. This is the most likely route for a small business. You don't run ScreenConnect yourself. You just have its client on your PCs. Whether you're exposed depends on whether your provider had RMM+ installed, and you can't see that from your end.
You run your own ScreenConnect server. Some businesses with an in-house IT person host it themselves. If that's you, you need to check the extensions today.
If nobody supports your PCs remotely, or they use a different tool, this one isn't about you.
What ConnectWise says to do
For the cloud version, ConnectWise says "No action required". It has disabled and removed the affected extensions from cloud-hosted ScreenConnect.
For self-hosted servers, the advice is to "Disable the RMM+ extension immediately and verify that it remains disabled." There isn't a fix yet. The advisory says "No fixed RMM+ version has been announced", so disabling it is the only option for now.
Huntress also advises checking that every ScreenConnect client is on version 26.6.5 or later. That version fixed a separate, earlier ScreenConnect flaw back in September.
What to do this week
1. Ask your IT provider. Something like: "Do you use ScreenConnect, did you have the RMM+ extension, and have you checked our PCs for the rogue client Huntress described?" A good provider will already know the answer and won't mind you asking.
2. If you run your own server, check the extensions. Disable RMM+ and any related ones listed in the advisory, and check they stay off. Then make sure the server and clients are up to date.
3. Look for an extra ScreenConnect. This is my advice rather than the vendor's. If you've got one known remote support tool, there should be one entry for it in your installed programs, not two. Huntress lists a Windows service called "Windows Update Agent" running UpdateConnect.ClientService.exe as one sign of the rogue client, and a file at C:\Windows\TEMP\sckit-decoder.ps1 as another. If you're not sure what you're looking at, ask before you delete anything.
4. If you find something, don't use ScreenConnect to clean it up. Again my advice. If the remote tool is how they got in, using the same tool to investigate means you're working through the door they opened. Unplug the machine from the network, and have it looked at locally or through a separate security tool.
5. Change passwords for anything staff use on those PCs. Huntress describes the toolkit trying to steal session cookies, the bits that keep you logged in to websites. Signing everyone out of email and cloud accounts and resetting passwords is a sensible step if a machine was touched.
The bigger point
Remote support tools are brilliant, because they save a site visit for a five-minute fix. But they're also a standing door into every PC they're installed on, and every add-on is another lock on that door.
It's worth knowing what remote access tools are on your machines and who holds the keys. If you can't answer that, it's a good thing to put on the list for your next chat with your IT provider. Dev Partners wrote about a similar question for software suppliers, what you'd do if one went bust, and the same "know who has access" thinking applies here.
If the remote access is to a bespoke system rather than office PCs, and the person who set it up has moved on, the team at Dev Partners take on existing software and can tidy up who can get into it.
And if you think a machine has already been got at, that's what my breach first response is for: contain it, find out what happened, and clean it up properly.
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